tracebin

Security

Copy for the future /security page. Every claim below describes shipped behavior.


tracebin runs a script on machines we don't own, operated by people who never signed up for our product. That shapes everything below: the design goal is that a reasonably suspicious person can verify what the script does rather than trust us.

How collection is kept honest

Consent before anything runs or uploads. A plain collection run stops at the manifest gate: every collected file is listed with its size and source, and nothing uploads until the customer types an explicit yes. They can exclude individual files first, or decline entirely. Wrapped runs (where the link runs a command first) ask for consent up front, after showing the command and the complete list of what will be collected. If the script cannot reach an interactive terminal to ask, it refuses to proceed rather than assuming consent.

The script is inspectable. It is plain POSIX shell — no binaries, no obfuscation — with its guarantees stated in a comment at the top: collects only the listed items, asks before uploading, never uses sudo, never installs anything. Every link page offers a download-first variant so the script can be read before it is run. Open-sourcing the collector is planned as part of leaving beta; the guarantee today is that every customer already receives the full source of exactly what they run.

Collection is bounded by the spec. The script collects the spec's globs and command outputs, nothing else. The optional file inventory records names, sizes, and modification times of the spec'd directories — never file contents. All staging happens in a temporary directory removed when the script exits.

Collection links

Data path and storage

Account and tenant isolation

What we don't have yet

Candor over polish:

Reporting

Found something? security@tracebin.dev. We read everything and respond to real reports quickly.